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Everybody has a part in many overlapping stories and it isn’t 
always clear which one is particularly your story
—Hoban (2003, p. 164)
Is there a connexion?
—Hoban (2002b, p. 12)
One may argue that no originals remain in our world
—Mitchell (2008a, p. 227)
It is no secret that Russell Hoban’s (1925-2011) masterwork, 
Riddley Walker (1980), is a strong central reference point for 
David Mitchell’s virtuoso, genre-shifting, six-part novel 
Cloud Atlas (2004), a fact often referred to in the notes of 
critical articles, but rarely explored in any detail (Edwards, 
2011; Machinal, 2011; Stephenson, 2011). Indeed, within 
Mitchell’s Russian-doll structural premise, itself a mirror of 
the many sub-narratives of Riddley Walker and other post-
modern fictions,1 the final diegetic layer is set in a post-apoc-
alyptic landscape where the inhabitants speak a mangled, 
phonetically transcribed language much akin to the 
“Riddleyspeak” within Hoban’s novel. This inter-textual 
anchor is one that Mitchell himself confirmed in a pamphlet 
for the 2005 “some poasyum [symposium]” of The Kraken, 
the Russell Hoban fan club, where he wrote,
Zachry’s voice is less hard-core and more Pacific than 
Riddleyspeak, but Mr Hoban’s singular, visionary, ingenious, 
uncompromising, glorious, angelic and demonic novel sat on my 
shelf as evidence that what I wanted to do could be done, and as 
encouragement to keep going until I’d got it right. (Mitchell, 2005)
In this article, I want to bring focus, first and foremost, to 
the ways in which Cloud Atlas’ inter-textuality is surpris-
ingly aesthetically conservative. Through an analysis of the 
formal contrivance of Cloud Atlas’ structure, I will argue 
that the novel forms a tapestry in which the binding thread 
becomes a re-performance of Russell Hoban’s Riddley 
Walker, but that this Orphic, nostalgic, backward-looking 
mode of textual weaving ultimately undermines our ability 
to claim Cloud Atlas as a future-orientated experimental 
work. This argument is bolstered by the fact that Mitchell’s 
appropriation of Hoban must be considered within the con-
texts of post-modern parody. In Linda Hutcheon’s (1985) 
formulation, this should include a “critical ironic distance” if 
works are to successfully re-contextualize their referents (p. 
37). While Hoban can be considered “a radically postmod-
ernist writer” (Wilkie-Stibbs, 2000, p. 165), one whose re-
working of the Punch and Judy show in Riddley Walker 
clearly exhibits this re-contextualization, Mitchell’s 21st-
century re-castings of his sources appear more repetitious 
and less differentiated than might be expected, especially 
given that many critics—although emphatically not Mitchell 
himself—are keen to describe the novel as “experimental” 
(Jeffries, 2013). Mitchell’s re-iterations of Hoban’s themes 
and language, I will argue, do not differ sufficiently for 
claims of radical experimentation to hold.
521636 SGOXXX10.1177/2158244014521636Sage OpenEve
research-article2014
1University of Lincoln, UK
Corresponding Author:
Martin Paul Eve, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool, Lincoln LN6 7TS, 
UK. 
Email: martin@martineve.com
“some kind of thing it aint us but yet its 
in us”: David Mitchell, Russell Hoban, and 
Metafiction After the Millennium
Martin Paul Eve1
Abstract
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As a secondary target of analysis, using Hutcheon’s for-
mulations as a basis, I also want to begin to frame Mitchell’s 
inter-textual reference in terms of metafiction, an aspect 
effected twofold through metanarratorial statements and 
extra-textual reference. Indeed, in historicizing both Mitchell 
and Hoban, it is easy to read the former within metatextual 
and metaleptic traditions of certain North American post-
modernist practices and situate the latter in various philo-
sophical discourses (theologocentrism and solipsistic 
idealisms), to which this article will return. In Cloud Atlas, 
metatextuality is related to inter-textuality and the ontologi-
cal authority bestowed on the text’s various diegetic layers, 
with every reference drawing attention to not only the work’s 
own relationship to other texts but also its own status as tex-
tual object. This is an aspect that sits within a long theoretical 
tradition and prominently featured in Gérard Genette’s 
model of hypo-/hyper-textuality and transpositions. Although 
for Genette (1997) it is true that “Every object can be trans-
formed, every manner imitated, and no art can by nature 
escape those two modes of derivation that define hypertextu-
ality” (p. 284), the function of his model in cases of known 
reference is to “assess [the] difference and the nature of the 
hypertextual relation” (p. 381). Extending this further, and 
also reaching back to the first assertion of this article, the 
charge of aesthetic conservativism, if we read Cloud Atlas 
under a different model, in this case, Riffaterre’s (1978) sys-
tem of “textual interpretants,” it feels as though Mitchell’s 
work lacks any substantial “intertextual conflict,” instead 
presenting a harmonious resonance rather than “conflicting 
codes” (p. 109). As will be shown throughout this article, 
while Mitchell’s text has high political potential—most nota-
bly in his treatment of the Moriori genocide—the delegiti-
mating function of the diegetic layering, coupled with an 
overly harmonious inter-textuality, has some problematic 
aspects. In its totality, I will finally argue, Mitchell’s fiction 
manages to map and inter-relate the mediated forms of which 
it is comprised; it is an enjoyable and accomplished whole. 
However, as Adorno has told us, the whole is the false. When 
the Atlas is segmented into its generic sovereign geographi-
cal regions, it is clear that they function autonomously and 
the map can once again become differentiated from the terri-
tory. The territories of the embedded narratives within the 
novel are smooth and self-contained; they become, in the 
case of Cloud Atlas, new false wholes. As Luisa Rey within 
that novel posits of Hitchcock,
the key to fictitious terror is partition or containment: so long as 
the Bates Motel is sealed off from our world, we want to peer in 
. . . But a film that shows the world is a Bates Motel, well that’s 
. . . dystopia.” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 95)
Mitchell’s (2008a) sub-plots seem to be the former of 
these types, sealed off, written in “neat little chapteroids, 
doubtless with one eye on the Hollywood screenplay” as the 
novel not only self-deprecatingly but also knowingly, puts it 
(p. 164). The novel’s genre-based recursion, already in itself 
a trope of post-modernist metafiction, gives us fragments 
that remain isolated and comparatively sparse. Despite the 
objection by post-structuralists and beyond of the ways in 
which all texts might be categorized as mosaics, echo-
chambers, or inter-readings (Barthes, 1975; Bloom, 1976; 
Broich, 1997; Kristeva, 1969), these fragments are mono-
referential, nostalgic recapitulations of source texts whose 
structural placement within the diegetic layering is a game in 
which, ultimately, very little appears to be at stake.
Backgrounds and Contexts: The 
Literary Philosophy of Russell Hoban in 
Cloud Atlas
To contextualize the comparative analysis deployed through-
out this piece and to give an understanding of Mitchell’s 
terms of reference, it is necessary and worthwhile to begin 
with a brief overview of the works of Russell Hoban, a figure 
whose corpus has largely been overlooked by the academy, 
and to give a summary with some examples of the features of 
Hoban’s works with reference to their parallels in Cloud 
Atlas. Over the course of a varied career as a wartime radio 
operator, an illustrator and then novelist, Russell Hoban 
wrote 16 adult novels (in multiple senses of “adult”) and at 
least 50 children’s books (Myers, 1984). From his earliest 
adult writing, The Lion of Boaz-Jachin and Jachin-Boaz, 
through Riddley Walker, Pilgermann, Mr. Rinyo-Clacton’s 
Offer, The Medusa Frequency, to Angelica Lost and Found, 
Hoban’s thematic concerns and philosophical lineage can be 
clearly defined. Broadly speaking, Hoban’s focus rests upon 
notions of flux (“flicker”) and ontological instability, in the 
Heraclitean tradition as described by Aristotle; solipsism and 
subjective idealism, particularly in the tradition of George 
Berkeley; transcendental idealism’s preoccupations with the 
split between phenomenon and noumenon (Wilkie, 1989b, p. 
17); a wariness of science, especially its applied weaponiza-
tion; an almost psychoanalytic styling of an unknowable 
self; and mythological references and allusive structures.
Briefly working through these concepts in order and it is 
clear that the very textual presence of flux and post-modern 
ontological instability tends to align Hoban’s texts with a 
more content-driven model of metatextuality, in Patricia 
Waugh’s sense of a spectrum in which many novels are, to 
varying degrees, metatextual (Waugh, 1984). This is well 
illustrated through Hoban’s re-writing of flux as “flicker” 
across his work, a concept that is inter-related with a diegetic 
layering of reality. In Fremder, for example, high-speed 
space travel is facilitated through “flicker drive,” explained 
as utilizing “the real reality . . . the moment under the 
moment” (Hoban, 1992a, Preface). This focus on a “real 
reality” not only serves to delegitimate the corresponding 
textual reality but also brings a transience and instability to 
Hoban’s worlds that clearly align with Brian McHale’s shift 
from a modernist epistemological dominant to a post-mod-
ernist ontological focus (McHale, 1986).
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Correspondingly, this focus on ontological plurality is, 
evidently, one of the most prominent aspects of Mitchell’s 
novel. This can be seen not only in the proliferation of trans-
historical sub-narratives but also through the dreams that 
pervade the text in parallel to Riddley Walker’s “trants 
[trance]” (Hoban, 2002b, p. 62). Indeed, as in Hoban, when 
coupled with the narrative’s interpolated ordering, these (de)
legitimating oneiric constructs consistently undercut stabil-
ity in Cloud Atlas. Taking, for example, the beginning of 
Frobisher’s story, it is clear that the preceding section has, at 
this moment, been cut off mid-sentence: “Reading my entry 
for 15th October, when I first met Rafael” (Mitchell, 2008a, 
p. 39). Mitchell (2008a) then begins Frobisher’s letters 
through a paratactic leap in which the dream construct is 
once again emphasized: “Dreamt I stood in a china shop so 
crowded from floor to far-off ceiling with shelves of porce-
lain antiques” (p. 43). Through this move, Mitchell at once 
signals the post-modern historiographic nature of his work (a 
delicate fictional/dream china shop filled with historical 
(likewise dreamt) antiques) while, more importantly, imply-
ing that the idea of a “real reality” is not to be found in the 
“Pacific Diary” section. There is, as he puts it, something 
“shifty about the journal’s authenticity” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 
64). Indeed, the only entity that claims an intra-diegetic cer-
tainty about reality is the criminal Seaboard corporation: “At 
Seaboard we deal in realities” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 104). In 
both Hoban’s and Mitchell’s works, aspects of metatextual-
ity function to both intra-diegetically and extra-textually 
destabilize the ontological certainty of layered realities.
This aspect crosses over into Hoban’s prominent subjec-
tive idealism that is almost always one wherein the protago-
nist’s existence depends on an external, ontologically 
unstable object-as-subject believing in the protagonist. This 
is most evident in two of Hoban’s texts, The Lion of Boaz-
Jachin and Jachin-Boaz and The Medusa Frequency. In the 
former, for instance, the narrator points out that the “lion,” 
which could be a hallucination of the narrator, could also be 
having a hallucinating featuring the narrator: “A lion halluci-
nates me” (Hoban, 2000, p. 125). Likewise, in The Medusa 
Frequency, there is a being called the “world-child” that 
believes in the world, thus holding it together: “The world-
child holds in its mind the idea of every single thing: root and 
stone, tree and mountain, river and ocean and every living 
thing” (Hoban, 2002a, p. 98). It is also noted here, however, 
that the beliefs of the world-child itself, in turn, come about 
from the “energy of belief,” “a kind of cohesion that binds 
together possibilities that have spun together out of the 
blackness” (Hoban, 2002a, p. 98). In short, as the narrator 
remarks, “it just keeps going round in a circle” (p. 99). In 
Cloud Atlas, Mitchell (2008a) likewise continues this think-
ing when Meronym posits that although “Old Georgie 
weren’t real for her . . . he could still be real for me” (p. 286). 
Such a troubling of perception and its connection to reality is 
linked to Hoban’s dreamscapes as, again, it becomes impos-
sible to tell the difference between dream and reality, one 
person and another, a riff on which Mitchell (2008a) is 
clearly also playing with regard to primarily visual percep-
tion when Luisa Rey thinks to herself, “Go home and just 
dream up your crappy three hundred words for once. People 
only look at the pictures, anyhow” (p. 90). As it becomes 
clear that existence depends on the perceiver, in both 
Mitchell’s and Hoban’s worlds, the necessity to query the 
aesthetic construction of the texts and the ways in which they 
structure our viewing increases; after all, “The flat world is 
curved in the boy’s eye” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 97).
Furthermore, the aspects of transcendental idealism that 
Hoban brings to the fore relate to the inadequacy of percep-
tion and the inaccessibility of true essence, thus often signal-
ing his texts’ situation in a post-modernist phase that also 
incorporates epistemological concerns. This is exemplified 
in the short story, “My Night with Léonie,” wherein an erotic 
encounter is sought with the noumenal sphinx, entailing the 
need to, once more, “move in behind the flickering to the 
moment under the moment” (Hoban, 1992b, p. 22). Often, 
however, this unknowable essence, this sub-moment, per-
tains to the self. In Riddley Walker, Hoban writes of “some 
kind of thing it aint us but yet its in us” (Hoban, 2002b, p. 6), 
while in Fremder and The Lion there is an inability to “know 
what was looking out of her eyes or mine” (Hoban, 2000, p. 
21; 2003, p. 110). Interestingly, this is an aspect that Hoban 
shares with Mitchell, whose Bill Smoke “wonders at the 
powers inside us that are not us” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 419).
Once more, however, this mode of unknowable things-in-
our-selves points back to Hoban’s texts as metafiction. This 
is because there is a strong personal dimension to such senti-
ments. Hoban has explicitly stated that he felt “inhabited by 
a consciousness that doesn’t seem to have originated with 
me” (Wilkie, 1989a, p. 101), while writing these texts, thus 
signaling authorial presence and simultaneous absence, a key 
metafictional trait (Aubry, 2011). Likewise, Mitchell (2008a) 
exhibits metafictional techniques in his own work’s generic 
placement when he writes of “backflashes” to the “1980s 
with MAs in Postmodernism and Chaos Theory” (p. 152). 
From this perspective of authorial presence and metafiction, 
the sense of deja vu encountered when opening Hoban’s The 
Medusa Frequency immediately after finishing Cloud Atlas 
is also significant. Indeed, Robert Frobisher in the latter 
directly echoes the disdain and longed-for evasion of Herman 
Orff in the former, both of which present the authorial fear of 
non-recognition: “Oh, should I have heard of you?” (Hoban, 
2002a, p. 12; Mitchell, 2008a, p. 467). This is not, however, 
the final word on their resonances for, crucially, the line is 
spoken, in both cases, by author surrogates within the texts. 
In Mitchell’s case, this much is clear. The “Cloud Atlas 
Sextet” composed by Frobisher specifically outlines the 
structure of the novel within which it is depicted. Described 
as a work in which “[a]ll boundaries are conventions” and 
that “one may transcend any convention” (Mitchell, 2008a, 
p. 479), the novel here metatextually signals its own inten-
tions to radical experimentation within a sextet form, with a 
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“semi-invented notion and . . . singular harmonics” (Mitchell, 
2008a, pp. 486-487), a “sextet for overlapping soloists” in 
which “each solo is interrupted by its successor” (Mitchell, 
2008a, p. 463). Mitchell (2008a) twofold acknowledges the 
danger here through the ironic mediation of the egoist 
Frobisher and the direct querying of whether this practice is 
“[r]evolutionary or gimmicky?” (p. 463), an aspect of judg-
ment to which this piece will return. However, there are also 
problems, of course, with reading Frobisher as a direct tran-
scription of Mitchell (2008a) beyond the usual warnings that 
must be sounded for this approach and that are echoed in 
Ayrs’ statement: “If they want to know ‘what I mean’ they 
should listen to my bloody music” (p. 71). For one, Frobisher 
appears as an extra-authorial presence in Black Swan Green, 
Mitchell’s (2006) semi-autobiographical fiction.
Hoban, however, deploys an identical strategy in The 
Medusa Frequency. Hermann Orff is clearly, in many ways 
and as with most of Hoban’s protagonists, affiliated with the 
author. For instance, Hoban’s (2002a) character is frustrated 
at the inability of newspapers to realize the inventiveness of 
his early novels when “The Times found the writing ‘a little 
slippery’; the Guardian noted that the story was ‘a downhill 
sort of thing’” (p. 12), one of Hoban’s frequent personal 
complaints.2 Crucially for a resonance with Mitchell’s dislo-
cated authorial self, however, Orff is also only partial. Other 
characters in The Medusa Frequency share Hoban’s (2002a) 
own personal traits, such as Gosta Kraken who is interesting, 
or pretentious, “for his use of Orpheus as semiosis rather 
than as story,” but is also “obsessive,” working the same 
material over and over because “[h]e says it’s an inexhaust-
ible theme and he’s got a lot of new ideas for another 
approach” (p. 105). Hoban’s autobiographical aspects are 
dispersed throughout his characters so that the novels form 
psychic maps of his unconscious; “Hoban operates as the 
classic, premodernist cult of the undead author who is tena-
ciously and egocentrically alive both in and out of his fic-
tions” as Wilkie-Stibbs (2000, p. 175) puts it.
Most interestingly, though, Hoban continually implies a 
mythico-allegorical backdrop to his fables. Often this can be 
inferred by the direct presence of mythical and religious fig-
ures in the content of Hoban’s novels: Boaz and Jachin, the 
devil figure in Mr. Rinyo-Clacton’s Offer, Orpheus, 
Eurydice, and others (including the over-sexed re-imagined 
hippogriff, from Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso in Angelica 
Lost and Found). In other ways, though, it is the form of 
allusive practice that Hoban deploys that leads to this read-
ing, the insinuation of meaning behind extra-ordinary occur-
rences that ties in with the transcendental idealism in his 
works. The broad range3 of often subtle allusion in Cloud 
Atlas fulfills a similar function in both its high and low com-
ponents to establish a specific cultural milieu against which 
to frame its narrative.
As some closing remarks on Hoban’s place within the 
canon, it is important to note that although Hoban’s themes 
are consistent throughout his oeuvre and are shared with 
Mitchell’s novels, it could be argued that Riddley Walker’s 
distinction as almost the only of Hoban’s adult novels to 
receive substantial academic attention attests to the varying 
standards of his work. As Wilkie-Stibbs (2000) puts it, 
“[w]hen we think of Russell Hoban we probably think of The 
Mouse and His Child [one of Hoban’s books for children] 
and Riddley Walker” (p. 165). It is certainly true that there 
was a marked decline in the quality of Hoban’s output in his 
later years between Come Dance with Me and My Tango 
with Barbara Strozzi, before a return to form in his final 
works.4 However, this stance does not bear up under scrutiny 
as even those works that fall outside these “bad times,” as 
Riddley might put it, have remained neglected.
Of Hoban’s works, Riddley Walker is the most critically 
discussed, not only on account of its formal invention but 
also because it is the most concessionary to critical dis-
courses. Indeed, the novel invites a Freudian analysis of the 
early primal scene in which Riddley “los [his] footing” and 
thereby crushes his father to death in Widders Dump (Hoban, 
2002b, p. 11), an episode that has a direct parallel not only 
with Goodparley’s failed differentiated repetition later in the 
text but also in Cloud Atlas (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 251). The 
text also seems to advise a Luddite caution against technol-
ogy and especially nuclear technology, as does Mitchell’s 
novel, in the “1 Littl 1” and the “1 Big 1” and the 
“Clevverness” that “is gone now but littl by littl itwl come 
back.”5 Finally, Riddley Walker foists “the shock of recogni-
tion” (Granofsky, 1986, p. 175) upon us, wherein we connect 
our reality to the intra-textual world that resonates with 
Mitchell’s cyclical version of history: “‘O, what we ben! 
And what we come to!’” (Hoban, 2002b, p. 100). Although 
only one novel written among a life dedicated to producing 
works that seem almost to be literary philosophy, Riddley 
Walker was the singular greatest aesthetic achievement of 
Hoban’s career and it is little surprise that, of all Hoban’s 
works, it is to this post-apocalyptic deconstruction of soci-
ety, myth, and language that Mitchell chooses to turn.
Mapping the Atlas: Metafiction, Genre-
Poaching, Diegesis, and Inter-Textuality
As has been briefly outlined in the preceding section, David 
Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas resonates with many of Hoban’s life-
long fascinations but particularly those with metafictive ele-
ments. There are, however, also divergences, particularly 
when notions of authorial presence are explored. This is 
most evident in the fact that, although Mitchell also deploys 
his authorial voice in a scattered fashion, the cartography of 
Cloud Atlas is not one of an unconscious but rather a literary-
historical consciousness that repeats itself in different formal 
registers. Indeed, Hoban (2002b) gives a description in 
Riddley Walker that would be just as suited to Cloud Atlas 
when Lorna notes that “What they are is diffrent ways of tell-
ing what happent” (p. 20) which then leads to a discussion of 
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the varying stylistic permutations through which the tales 
could be told: “Les jus tern it roun and look at it the other 
way” (p. 23). In many senses, then, the genre parody in 
Mitchell’s work is reminiscent of, but works very differently 
to, Thomas Pynchon’s Against the Day, wherein a mode of 
“mediated historiography” has been mapped by Brian 
McHale (2011, p. 25). Mitchell’s progression of genres 
seems emblematic of a similar historiographic metafictive 
function in his works. Moving from allusion to Melville and 
seafaring narrative, through to an epistolary form, into the 
crime thriller mode, delving into farce before hitting science/
speculative fiction and then the post-utopian Hoban frame, 
Mitchell charts a parallel project of historiography at the aes-
thetic level.
The sources and contexts that inform Mitchell’s genre-
poaching and the polyvocal constitution of Cloud Atlas’ 
shored fragments are many. In his Book World interview, 
Mitchell gave his own take on sources for the work and in 
each instance, this is informative. In other ways, though, 
Mitchell does not get the last word on this: The histories of 
the genres he deploys are wider ranging than he anticipated. 
This is well illustrated in the novel’s first section. Written in 
the diary form of a seafaring narrative, Mitchell states, “[m]y 
character Ewing was (pretty obviously) Melville, but with 
shorter sentences” (Book World, 2004). The seafaring voy-
age narrative obviously has a history that stretches back at 
least to the Odyssey but, in prose style and Pacific location, 
Mitchell’s frame is substantially narrowed. However, 
although it might be tempting to frame “The Pacific Diaries” 
segment in terms of a Melville-Hemingway cross-pollination 
(“Melville, but with shorter sentences”) and for which Robert 
Foulke’s (1997, pp. 112-136) chapter on these authors would 
be highly instructive, the seafaring romance is undercut by 
its situational irony of a layered metatext. Instead, the pri-
mary focus of the first chapter of Cloud Atlas, at a level that 
escapes the genre-irony through readerly dramatic irony, is 
upon the Moriori genocide. Impossible but to re-contextual-
ize in terms of later (and more widely remarked upon in 
European and American discourse) 20th-century horrors, 
this first segment, when stripped of its contrivance, is closely 
aligned with the post-modern relativism of texts such as 
Pynchon’s V. Indeed, Pynchon’s (1995) first novel specifi-
cally invokes this same mode of trans-temporal, relativizing 
comparison through its representation of the genocide com-
mitted against the Herero populous in its ultra-ironic quip: 
“[t]his is only 1 per cent of six million, but still pretty good” 
(p. 245). It is, I would suggest, this focus upon genocide and 
the relativity of these events to one another, including that to 
American slavery and the “underground rail-road” (Mitchell, 
2008a, p. 27) that defines the lowest diegetic layer of Cloud 
Atlas.6
The epistolary framing of Frobisher’s letters to Sixsmith 
in the second level of Mitchell’s novel is also fairly easy to 
place. In fact, Mitchell has stated that this segment derives 
specifically from “Christopher Isherwood, especially in 
Lions and Shadows” (Book World, 2004). More interesting, 
however, is the signification of the history of this mode. The 
epistolary novel, in Joe Bray’s (2003) assessment, was most 
prominent in the period from “Roger L’Estrange’s first trans-
lation of Les Lettres portugaises in 1678 to Jane Austen’s 
decision in late 1797 or early 1798 to transform the probably 
epistolary ‘Elinor and Marianne’ into the third-person narra-
tive of Sense and Sensibility,” but frequently comes under 
fire for its “perceived inferiority in a key area of the novel’s 
responsibilities: the representation of consciousness” (p. 1). 
While Bray’s (2003, p. 19) study of the epistolary form deals 
with the matter in far more detail than can be attempted here, 
the focus he brings to Laura Visconti’s (1994, p. 299) argu-
ment that “the letter leaves out the past and ignores the 
future” is interesting in Mitchell’s case. In a doubly curious 
passage in Cloud Atlas that deliberately distorts this tempo-
ral characteristic with the same fusion of musical language 
and temporality as Hoban’s substitution of “minim” for 
“minute” in Riddleyspeak, Mitchell (2008a) frames 
Frobisher’s suicide thus: “Shot myself through the roof of 
my mouth at 5 a.m.” (p. 487). Although it is true that 
Frobisher has “no knowledge of the larger story in which 
these events may ultimately play a role” (MacArthur, 1990, 
p. 8), in Cloud Atlas, the same predicament is true for the 
reader: Only in Black Swan Green does Mitchell relate the 
full impact of the suicide. Aside from other aspects, particu-
larly the fact that this is another text where the “dominant 
motifs of epistolarity [have been continued] into the twenty-
first century,” the key aspect upon which I want to draw here, 
and to which I will return, is the temporal disjunction 
(Kauffman, 1992, p. 222).
The Luisa Rey segment of Cloud Atlas has been attrib-
uted, by the author, as “any generic airport thriller” (Book 
World, 2004), but there is also an underlying affinity here 
with the Melville of the first section for, as Susan Elizabeth 
Sweeney (2010) writes, “Postmodernist crime novels inevi-
tably hark back to Hawthorne’s and Melville’s dark 
romances” (p. 164). Although it is tempting to situate Cloud 
Atlas, mostly for its historical placement, in the post–post-
modernist camp, the novel is distinctly post-modern; as with 
Hoban, its nested Chinese-box structure, ontological plurali-
ties, already-seen affinities to American post-modernists, 
and metatextual functions are instantly recognizable. The 
Luisa Rey mystery detective portion, then, is not “any 
generic airport thriller” because it is instead situated within 
an ironic genre-fusion wherein the further one quests, the 
less one knows, again with parallels to Pynchon, among 
others.7
The Ghastly Ordeal of Timothy Cavendish is perhaps the 
hardest section of Cloud Atlas to place, but also yields some 
insights into the overall mechanism of the novel. Mitchell’s 
own description of the generic precursor here is singularly 
unhelpful, with an air of Gertrude Stein: “Cavendish is 
Cavendish” (Book World, 2004). That said, it is probably 
most applicable, albeit in the form of a novel, to designate 
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the genre as “farce.” Indeed, Barbara Bowen [née Cannings] 
gives a helpful, if extremely crude, key to distinguishing 
farce from other modes. For Bowen, although many works 
may feature “the accidents of humdrum existence—conjugal 
infidelity, debtors and creditors, petty thieves and swindlers, 
family quarrels” (Cannings, 1961, p. 558),
if it is about people it is a farce, whereas if it is about political, 
historical or religious ideas, if its significance is symbolic rather 
than personal, or if it is merely a display of verbal pyrotechnics, 
it is not a farce (Cannings, 1961, p. 560)
This distinction, although blunt, helps explain “the criti-
cal prejudice against farce” that Joan Dean (1982, p. 485) 
raises in her article on the re-shaping of the form by 1960s 
dramatists such as Joe Orton but also somewhat troubles the 
mode in Cloud Atlas. At one level, the narration is clearly 
concerned with the personal woes of the narcissistic protago-
nist. In other ways, though, the juxtaposition of the genre 
with others elevates it into significatory status and, therefore, 
into a non-farcical mode. It seems, from this “Schrödinger’s 
novel” formulation, that Cavendish can at once embody 
intra-textual farce and extra-textual reference. The referent 
to which the farcical signifier refers must be, as the prime 
cause of all the subsequent actions, the literary publishing 
world, in which the novel once more makes its own condi-
tions of production perspicacious and enters the realm of 
metafiction.
The penultimate level of Cloud Atlas, “An Orison of 
Sonmi~451,” is described by Mitchell as “borrowed from 
gossip magazines in which a rather gushing hack interviews 
some celeb bigwig” (Book World, 2004), but this is plainly 
addressing only the aesthetic interview format that Mitchell 
adopts. Indeed, this episode is split, by this choice of format, 
into two further diegetic levels. The most privileged of these 
layers is the interview format, but the inner narrative is still 
interesting for the discussion here because Mitchell re-pres-
ents, within his speculative fiction genre-imitation, this same 
structural layering. For instance, consider that the world of 
Sonmi~451 is a tale of two cities, or at least of two classes: 
the above-world and a “fabricant underclass” (Mitchell, 
2008b, p. 352).8 This is a situation that is mirrored in Hoban’s 
novel Fremder, albeit with a somewhat inverted mode that is 
more akin to Walter M. Miller’s A Canticle for Leibowitz 
with its scenes where “angry mobs systematically hunt down 
the intelligent and the educated” (Cowart, 1989, p. 81). In 
Fremder, Hoban’s (2003) own excursion into the realm of 
speculative fiction, Class A subjects such as Fremder Gorn 
are given safe passage by specific class-segregated “walk-
ways” whereas the “street level” is populated by “Prongs and 
Arseholes, Shorties, Clowns, Funboys, Executives and 
Wankers” where the primary activity is “kicking each other’s 
heads in” (pp. 148-149). In a way, Mitchell’s and Hoban’s 
critiques are similar here, but present inter-class violence 
very differently. Hoban shows the result of an ever-widening 
chasm between a techno-class that views itself as superior 
and an uneducated mob, while Mitchell (2008a) demon-
strates the mediated and hidden violence of a vast wealth gap 
that depends on slave labor, albeit a wealth that seems, in this 
future society, to be technologically rooted, “[t]hen, as now, 
dystopia was a function of poverty” (p. 244).
Although this lends a certain political credence, or proj-
ect, to Mitchell’s novel, one of the key problems with, or 
aspects of, the text is that the frequent and deliberate use of 
metatextual tropes relegates each sequential diegetic layer to 
that of a mere story; these are, after all, overlapping “solo-
ists,” rather than a harmonious, simultaneous sextet. There 
can be no re-connection with the reader’s reality except 
through formalizations such as the shared predicament 
already outlined in the epistolary section. Despite the trans-
gressive metalepsis that Courtney Hopf (2011) signals as 
violating the hermetic nature of this narrative, the overall 
conceit of Cloud Atlas’ structure tends to undo any genuine 
potential for intrusion. That is, except for the one narrative in 
Cloud Atlas that is “granted the highest ontological author-
ity”: Sloosha’s Crossin’ (Hopf, 2011, p. 118). Despite being 
positioned oddly for a section with “ontological authority”—
it is the final, encapsulating narrative chronologically, but 
neither the first nor the last narrative of the linear textual 
object—this sub-narrative, the “reality” within which all the 
other mere tales are encapsulated, can be read as the most 
privileged diegetic layer and is, as we know, inspired by 
Russell Hoban. What can now become clear, however, is the 
extent to which the entire form of Cloud Atlas owes much to 
Hoban’s fictionally realized philosophies and how the for-
mer appears as a derivative, rather than a radical experimen-
tation, in this light.
Sloosha’s Crossin’, Riddley Walker, 
Repetition and Difference
Through the generic map of Mitchell’s text that I have pre-
sented here, alongside Russell Hoban’s philosophico-literary 
oeuvre, I have attempted to sketch out the beginnings of an 
affinity on a stance toward metafiction between the writers. 
This stance can be seen most clearly in Hoban’s work in the 
essay “Pan Lives” in The Moment Under the Moment, his 
piece on reality, textuality, and the nature of thought, expres-
sion, and representation, an essay that is useful for a cross-
comparison with Mitchell on issues of free will and 
philosophies of language. This essay expresses sentiments as 
close to Hoban’s central vision as seems possible, especially 
given that the volume’s foreword forewarns the reader that 
“Reality is ungraspable.” Indeed, Hoban seems here trying to 
sketch out knowledge as a “provisionalized product of an 
open dialogue,” as Graeme Wend-Walker (2012, p. 30) puts 
it, a conversation with reality that is ongoing and within 
which we are situated. At the beginning of this essay, Hoban 
(1992c) describes the “coming of evening to Eelbrook 
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Common” but immediately notes that “It seems . . . that what 
I was describing was itself language, all of it . . . . To me it 
seems that everything that happens is language” (p. 126). 
This is, obviously, a form of logocentrism and tends toward 
an explicit mode of metafiction, but it does not appear to be 
a logocentrism of the purely structuralist variety. Although 
Hoban (1992c) posits a potential external point of reference 
as the “universal mind,” asking “Can God and word and rea-
son be thought of separately?” and answering “Obviously 
not” (p. 127), “Pan Lives” also inter-relates linguistics and 
knowledge,
Now he doesn’t know any more than he did before but he has a 
word to call it by. Will he think less about what the word refers 
to now? . . . Can there come a time when he will perceive only 
those things there are words for? . . . No, not my Ben [Hoban’s 
son]. . . . If I say there’s a language failure somewhere does that 
make any sense? Am I saying that there’s an everything failure? 
(pp. 130-131)
This type of thinking appears to generate two contradictory 
statements: (a) all things are language; but (b) language is 
independent of, and mediately refers to, things. This is dialec-
tically resolved when Berkeley’s solipsistic idealism is re-
introduced: The universal consciousness, analogous to an 
author in Hoban’s (1992c) setup, creates through a universal 
language, “the language of everything” (p. 139), which merely 
remains unknown and appears to have a referential quality. All 
sub-languages are derived from this universal language which 
“meant itself, that’s all” (Hoban, 1992c, p. 137).
Varying philosophies of language advance arguments for 
the ways in which this kind of thinking can constrain our 
potential for ethical agency and which thereby provide an 
overlap with Mitchell’s work in the sphere of metafiction. 
Foremost among these is Wittgenstein’s early consideration 
of atomized propositions that must exhibit logical indepen-
dence and which also rests on the basis of the ability to ana-
lyze language down into elementary propositions (Tejedor, 
2011). Seemingly designed to counteract Schopenhauer’s 
conceptions of noumenal will, Wittgenstein’s (2006) view 
posits no necessary causal connection between propositions 
and so gives no potential translation between will and action. 
The atomism of Hoban’s linguistic philosophy seems to 
imply a similar setup: Characters frequently find their episte-
mologies and ontologies constrained by forces over which 
they have no control and commonsensical causal links are 
demolished. This is, certainly, not so very far from the narra-
tor’s proclamation in Mitchell’s Ghostwritten that our lives 
are “pre-ghostwritten by forces around us” (Mitchell, 2000, 
p. 296), or Somni ~451’s declaration in Cloud Atlas that 
“free will plays no part in my story” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 
365). Indeed, characters in Cloud Atlas, from Cavendish 
through to Frobisher, Sixsmith, Rey, and Ewing, are continu-
ally moved by forces beyond their control, which is the sin-
gular advantage of Mitchell’s sweeping temporal range. Of 
course, in this case, it is more a generic than historical geist 
that taints their existence.
Metafiction appears to take the form of such a constrain-
ing sub-structure, a “language of everything.” Although this 
is, in one sense, a restatement of Waugh’s argument, refram-
ing it in this way allows the concept to be cast in the realm of 
agency and progressive empowerment within the domain of 
literary production. This becomes important when it is seen 
that inter-textuality is not only one of the oldest elementary 
propositions within the metafictive master language but also 
one of its most potentially conservative. Such a sentiment 
has to be approached with caution: The modernist and post-
modernist projects of experimentation and revitalization of 
the encyclopedic form cannot be said, in every instance, to 
perpetuate this conservativism. Indeed, within the frames 
here discussed, Hoban’s works are enlivened through their 
subversive re-workings of the Orpheus myth, Orlando 
Furioso and appropriations of German Expressionist cin-
ema. Likewise, Cloud Atlas is interesting, if not pioneering, 
in its generic topography. However, where this work becomes 
problematic is its point of crossing over into nostalgia.
As suggested at the outset of this piece, if the experimen-
tal form of inter-textual reference is to be preserved, I would 
suggest that at least one of two factors should be present: (a) 
the work should radically supplement, rework, or subvert, 
beyond recuperation, the source text; (b) the work should 
layer itself to provide an overloaded proliferation of referents 
to destabilize and re-contextualize the source material. 
Mitchell fares ambivalently by these measures. Clearly, as 
with Self’s The Book of Dave, Mitchell’s use of Riddley 
Walker is acknowledged and derivative. Although David 
Cowart (1989) praises the fact that “Hoban surely knows that 
a language would change more radically in twenty-five hun-
dred years” and so Riddleyspeak must be deemed a “bril-
liantly stylized version of the English language as it would 
exist in the fifth millennium,” this puts Mitchell’s even more 
recognizable language in a tricky spot (p. 87). Can it be said, 
though, that Mitchell’s language is also “not to be taken as a 
realistic depiction of linguistic principles, but rather as a 
metaphor for the scale of human disaster” and, if so, must we 
concede that there is a lessened effect at work here by com-
parison to the work to which it refers? (Cowart, 1989, p. 87)
This is debatable. The linguistic derivatives in Cloud 
Atlas are clearly less radically experimental than in Hoban’s 
work. Conducting a comparison and collocation exercise 
using Peter Christian’s (2012) Riddley Walker Concordance 
makes this derivation clear. Consider, for instance, the first 
sentence of Sloosha’s Crossin’, “Old Georgie’s path an’ 
mine crossed more times’n I’m comfy mem’ryin, an’ after 
I died, no sayin’ what that fangy devil won’t try an’ do to 
me” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 249). Conversely, Riddley Walker 
begins thus,
On my naming day when I come 12 I gone front spear and kilt a 
wyld boar he parbly ben the las wyld pig on the Bundel Downs 
by guest on February 11, 2014Downloaded from 
8 SAGE Open
any how there hadnt ben none for a long time befor him nor I 
aint looking to see none agen. (Hoban, 2002b, p. 1)
First, note that these sentences share several thematic 
characteristics: temporal locative phrases; aspects pertaining 
to memory and the past; references to, or characterizations 
as, wild beasts; and speculations on the future. This thematic 
similarity only increases when, in relation to Riddley’s 
“naming day,” again on the first page, Zachry is told to 
“Name y’self, boy, is it Zachry the Brave or Zachry the 
Cowardy?” (Mitchell, 2008a, p. 249). Mitchell’s language is, 
however, instantly more comprehensible, and instantly less 
experimental, as it deploys sub-clausal commas to mark dif-
ferent senses and apostrophes to indicate elided word forms: 
“an’,” “times’n,” “mem’ryin’,” “y’self,” and “sayin’.” This 
gives, in Mitchell’s work, a strange perspective on the narra-
tion. At this point, it is supposedly Zachry’s now elderly son, 
far in the future, telling his father’s story. However, the way 
the tale is written with eliding apostrophes indicates that the 
grammatical conventions of the authorial environment 
(which, again, can be a different environment to the diegetic 
proleptic telling of the tale) are such that elision is required 
when notating the past upon which it looks back. As a corol-
lary, in the entire text of Riddley Walker, there are no apos-
trophes, thereby giving a more immanent position and further 
avoiding the nostalgia trap.
Using the concordance allows easy identification of the 
synonymous terms deployed between the authors. Within 
this first sentence, approximately9 53% of the terms used are 
identical, or practically so, to the vocabulary of Riddley 
Walker and are shared directly with contemporary usage: 
“old,” “path,” “mine” (Hoban: “my”), “comfy” (Hoban: 
“easy”), “after,” “I” (Hoban: “i”), “died” (Hoban: “dead”), 
“no,” “what,” “that,” “try,” “do,” “to,” and “me.” A further 
15% of the sentence can be seen as identical with both 
Hoban’s, and contemporary, usage when Mitchell’s signaled 
elision is removed to give “and” and “saying.” From here, 
however, the two texts diverge. Hoban’s unsignaled elision 
can be seen as more complex than Mitchell’s forms, consti-
tuting 11.5% of the first sentence of the latter with “more 
times’n” (for which Hoban would give “moren”), “I’m” and 
“won’t.” In the remaining 15% of the sentence, Hoban and 
Mitchell use different terms: For “crossed,” Hoban would 
most likely give “mixt”; for “mem’ryin’,” Hoban renders 
“memberment”; in the case of “fangy,” Hoban (2002b) gives 
“toofy”; and the closest we get to “devil” in Riddley Walker 
would be “Mr Clevver” with “the same red face and littl 
poynty beard and the horns and all” and his satanic rhyming 
slang, “they call me Mr On The Levvil” (p. 137). It is also 
clear here that for half of this final 15%, Mitchell uses two 
terms that are straightforward contemporary English 
(“crossed” and “devil”), whereas in the other half (“fangy” 
and “mem’ryin’”), Hoban’s usage remains more experimen-
tal and, in the case of “toofy,” phonetic.
Such empirical linguistic analysis is far from conclusive. 
For a start, the small sample of the first sentence is only one 
measure by which the experimental form can be judged and, 
in this case, I have taken account neither of word order typol-
ogies in the works, nor that this mode takes Mitchell’s sen-
tence as the base and cross-correlates with the entirety of 
Hoban’s novel. It remains clear, though, even if demon-
strated with a small, weighted sample, that Riddley Walker’s 
vocabulary is more complex and difficult to parse than that 
found in Cloud Atlas, with phrases in the former unmatched 
in the latter such as “deacon terminations” for decontamina-
tions, “fissional seakerts” playing on nuclear technology and 
the Official Secrets Act, and “spare the mending” for experi-
menting. With this aside, then, what could be said more 
broadly about the measures of experimental inter-textuality 
already mapped out?
By these yardsticks, Mitchell’s novel is not an instance 
of radical inter-textuality. His use of broader generic tropes 
is clever, and it is an understatement to say that Mitchell is 
a virtuoso writer of the shifting voice. However, the most 
explicit referent in the work, Hoban’s Riddley Walker, is 
appropriated as an ur-text that merely serves to replicate 
itself. Mitchell’s text harkens back to Riddley Walker only 
with the desire to repeat it. Indeed, the frame of a post-
apocalyptic environment, containing sub-narratives, with 
the same linguistic tropes as Hoban’s novel creates an 
environment that fails to re-contextualize its source. 
Although there is some danger of couching this referential 
function within an outmoded naïve chronology of prog-
ress, it nonetheless holds true that in Mitchell’s text, and in 
others that deploy a similar formation such as Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road, this presents a mode of past orien-
tation with nostalgia, rather than future orientation for 
experimentation.
This is not, as I’ve taken pains to point out throughout 
this piece, to overly disparage Mitchell’s (2008a) novel in 
some Leavis-esque manner, to become one Felix Finch 
among Cloud Atlas’ “cloud of critics” (p. 149), the types 
who “insert the ‘Mr.’ before sinking the blade in” (p. 150), 
but merely to pre-empt and tentatively counter claims for 
experimental novelty and new generic classifications. It is 
also clear, though, that the specific use of Riddley Walker is 
a derivation that only moderately transforms the work and 
appears to be conservatively longing for by-gone radical 
forms; art through situation (a form of generic placement) is 
not a new phenomenon. Although this conflicts with the 
pleasure of reading Mitchell’s novel, which remains great, 
it is important to recognize the function of reference and 
metafiction after the millennium to identify whether we are, 
too, succumbing to a nostalgia, wistfully looking back, 
believing that coherent sovereign fragments nested together 
add up to an experimental overloading and to remember, 
after all, that “[i]n the false world all ηδονη [pleasure] is 
false” (Adorno, 2004, p. 15).
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Notes
1. Even within the first 20 pages of Riddley Walker, we are given 
two such narratives: “The Hart of the Wood” and “Why the Dog 
Won’t Show Its Eyes.”
2. Curiously, however, if Orff is a Hoban surrogate, he is a 
downgraded version of the author. As with Roberto Bolaño’s 
reclusive author character Benito von Archimbaldi in his final 
masterpiece, 2666, whose literary talent is depicted as inferior 
to Bolaño’s own (Farred, 2010, p. 699), Orff abandons his high 
pretensions and succumbs to “writ[ing] comics” to earn a liv-
ing (Hoban, 2002a, p. 12). Although Bolaño’s (2009) author 
continues to write novels, Archimbaldi’s style is full of preten-
tious tics, with chapters ending in clumsy, repeated phrases in an 
effort to be poetic, a trait that, incidentally, draws literary critics 
to his work. In both cases, Bolaño and Hoban cannot let their 
author figures out-write them.
3. For instance, we are given The Tempest with its island “hum-
ming” (6), Coleridge (30), Nietzsche (63), Wagner (65), Emily 
Brontë (67), The Merchant of Venice, The Portrait of Dorian 
Gray (74), Verlaine and Rimbaud (81), Webern (83), M*A*S*H 
(90), Disney’s The Jungle Book (91), Norman Mailer (109), 
David Bowie (149), Macbeth (171), and innumerable others.
4. Although I cannot conclusively prove it, I attribute this return 
to form to the informal editorial intervention in 2007 of Jake 
Wilson (who appears as a character in Soonchild).
5. Interestingly, the term “Big 1” (or “Big I”) also appears in 
Mitchell, Cloud Atlas (2008a, p. 305). Cloud Atlas also advo-
cates a cycle of civilization, rather than positivist progression, 
through its many allusions to Gibbon. For one such example, see 
Hoban (2002b, p. 318), Riddley Walker, p. 4.
6. The ontological authority awarded to each of the diegetic lay-
ers in Cloud Atlas can be disputed. In one reading, the primary 
thesis that I will advance here, the final narrative to appear 
(“Sloosha’s Crossin’”) has the highest authority as it is the most 
chronologically advanced and contains all the other narratives 
as mere texts. In another reading, however, the inverse could be 
deduced; this narrative, after all, appears last.
7. It is notable that Hoban specifically denied having read, as 
one example, any Pynchon when I questioned him in 2009 in 
El Metro restaurant, Fulham (although Hoban’s statement is of 
debatable veracity as he also often claimed, with limited truth, 
to abstain from any contemporary fiction).
8. Note that this phrase only appears in the Kindle Edition, which 
is substantially different to the printed version.
9. Figures are rounded down; hence, the total is not 100%.
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